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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After the gratuitous assertion that the McDonald Brothers, 
Inc. (the "McDonalds") Statement of Facts is "either contradicted 
by the record or are gross misstatements of the record" (Br. 3 
n.l), the Brief of Appellee ("Br.") Neil P. Christenson, et al. 
("Christenson") fails to contradict or dispute a single fact, 
material or otherwise, we have stated. To the contrary, the pur-
pose of Christenson1s tedious recitation is acknowledged at Br. 3 
to be, not the correction of facts, but to place "the statement of 
Undisputed Facts contained in Security Fundingsfs Summary Judgment 
Memorandum" before this Court. That, we submit, is improper and 
an unwarranted imposition on the time and resources of this Court. 
1/ 
The only variation of consequence in the facts offered by 
2/ 
Christenson from that of the McDonalds, other than as to format, 
is the effort to justify Christenson1s handling of the transaction 
by urging that the payment to Forex Monetary, Ltd. ("Forex") was 
contemplated by a taped telephone conversation not contained in 
the Record. See Br. 6, 21, 23 n.7, 27 n.ll. Such assertions are 
Christenson's brief does supply additional detail concerning the business 
and background of the McDonalds and their prior relations with Sorenson, which 
is uncontroverted but also irrelevant. It bears repeating in that regard that 
the trial judge made specific mention that Christenson1s preoccupation with 
"the details of this saga are unimportant" and its essentials quite simple. 
Mem. Op. 3. 
2We can acknowledge that supplying the record citations, which were un-
available when the McDonalds brief was filed, may also be a useful complement. 
It is of significance to Christenson1s claims that on the existing record 
it is not even possible to determine the proper spelling of "Forex." Christen-
son refers to it as "Fourex." E.g., Br. 7. Other testimony refers to it as 
"Four X." Zabriski Depo. No. 2, pp. 32-34. Our spelling is taken from the 
Garrett deposition, p. 21. Since there is no documentation concerning it, and 
the documentation attached to the depositions contains divergent spellings, the 
discrepancy cannot be resolved. 
a p l a i n m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n when p r e s e n t e d as a " f a c t , " for t h e 
t ape was no t found by t h e t r i a l judge t o be p a r t of t h e McDonalds' 
b a r g a i n and was never even p l aced i n e v i d e n c e . S e l f - s e r v i n g 
s t a t e m e n t s concern ing i t s c o n t e n t s a r e t h e r e f o r e improper , c e r -
t a i n l y so long a s Ch r i s t en son f a i l s t o produce t h e t a p e and make 
i t s c o n t e n t s of r e c o r d . 
The McDonalds a r e p l a i n l y no t bound by hea r s ay concern ing 
the t a p e . We i n v i t e t h i s C o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t a t 
Br. 6-7 Chr i s t en son f a i l s t o c i t e any t e s t imony of t h e McDonalds, 
bu t r e l i e s e n t i r e l y upon t h e t e s t imony of Ne i l P. Ch r i s t en son and 
h i s a g e n t , Dave G a r r e t t . That t e s t imony merely d e s c r i b e s how they 
mishandled the t r a n s a c t i o n i n Camden, New J e r s e y , fol lowed by t h e 
b land and u n s u p p o r t a b l e a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e i r conduct was as contem-
p l a t e d by t h e t a p e . We a l s o i n v i t e t h i s Court t o pay c a r e f u l 
Neil P. Christenson's testiiroiy, and that of his agent, Garrett, i s the 
only testiinony cited a t Br. 7 supporting the assertions concerning the missing 
tape, and even that testimony i s ambiguous. I t i s hearsay, in any event, under 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c): 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" i s a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying a t the t r i a l or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
Unless affirmed by the McDonalds, such statements may not be considered. See 
the exceptions to hearsay a t Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d): 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement i s 
offered against a party and i s (A) his own statement, in 
ei ther his individual or a representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption 
or belief in i t s t ruth, or (C) a statement by a person 
authorized by him to make a statement concerning the 
subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant con-
cerning a matter within the scope of his agency or 
ertployment, made during the existence of the relat ion-
ship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party 
during the course and in the furtherance of the conspiracy. 
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attention to the fact that the testimony of Larry Sorenson — 
the person with whom the McDonalds had their contact — cited at 
Br. 6 to support the spurious assertion that he "understood from 
the Taped Conversation" that the money would not be applied.at a 
"closing," squarely refutes that assertion or that he understood 
the $288,000 was to be paid into the Forex account. 
Q. [By Mr. Anderson] The question is whether there 
was some discussion during that taped telephone conver-
sation as to the $288,000 being at risk? 
A. I don't recall any conversation of that risk 
or not at risk at all. I recall everything was supposed 
to close out in three to seven days after the money was 
there. 
Q. Was there some discussion, during that conver-
sation that was taped, Larry, what would happen to the 
$288,000 if the billion dollar loan did not come through? 
A. I don't recall at all on that. 
Q. What was your understanding as to what would 
happen to the money, the $2 88,000 if the loan didn't go 
through? 
A. My understanding was — well, my personal 
feeling was that, from the period of time the money was 
released, there would be a couple of days where there 
would be some at-risk situation. 
Q. That was assuming that it went through? 
A. Yeah, but I don't recall anything other than 
that. (Sorenson Deposition dated March 4, 1986, at 
57-58, R. 699-714) (Emphasis added.) 
Christenson therefore serves this Court badly, we submit, by 
burdening it with unnecessary detail, and worse by taking improper 
liberty with the facts on the crucial issue of the "bargain" 
being to apply the $288,000 to a "closing," as determined by the 
trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The Brief of Appellee is a study in contradiction and incon-
sistency. It acknowledges that the McDonalds1 agreement must be 
found in "extrinsic evidence" (Br. 22), but then urges that the 
trial judge's findings based upon the stipulated extrinsic evidence 
—
 v i z
* ' that the $288,000 was to be applied to closing costs — 
cannot be considered by this Court if not recited in the promissory 
note and trust deed (Br. 23-24, 27-28, 34, 36). The conditional 
nature of the McDonalds1 guaranty may not be found in extrinsic 
evidence (Br. 36), it is reasoned, even though the very fact of the 
note and trust deed being a guaranty must be supplied by extrinsic 
sources. (E.g., Br. 35 n.18.) On the other hand, Christenson"s 
payment of the $288,000 to Forex, a stranger to the transaction 
not referred to in the note and trust deed, is excused with the 
assertion it was contemplated by a taped telephone conversation 
never found by the trial judge to be a part of the agreement or 
even introduced into evidence. 
When the issue is justifying its own conduct, Christenson 
ignores the terms of the note and trust deed entirely, finding no 
difficulty in urging that the necessary "consent" to the change in 
Currier's performance may be implied (Br. 43-44). The Release of 
Mountain West, Br. 10, also need not be recited in the note and 
trust deed and may be implied. Then when the issue is Christenson1s 
obligation to good faith and fair dealing imposed under UCC § 1-203, 
Christenson again reverts to the argument that no such duty may be 
enforced if not recited in the terms of the written agreement 
itself (Br. 30). 
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More inconsistency and contradiction is evident in the urging 
that the findings and conclusions of the trial judge "are not 
entitled to any particular deference" (Br. 17), but at Br. 28 n.12 
it is urged that the trial judge's finding that Christenson is 
not bound by representations of Sorenson and Zabriski are binding 
on this court "as a matter of law." Christenson surely knows 
better, for each and every issue proposed by counsel at Br. 1 is 
framed in terms of whether "the trial court properly rule[d]". 
But when confronted with the fatal effect of the trial court's 
rulings, Christenson is forced to urge that they may not be con-
sidered. 
This Court surely will not be misled by such untenable con-
tradictions. Such arguments merely illustrate the degree to 
which the result reached by the trial judge cannot be sustained 
and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court is thus treated to the spectacle — rare, we are 
confident — of an appellee arguing against a decision of a trial 
judge in its favor. Confronted with the failure of the findings 
to support the result reached, Christenson is forced to urge that 
the trial judge's findings are not to be considered and that the 
hearing in this Court is, in effect, a trial de novo. 
POINT I 
Christenson Misapprehends the 
"Standard of Review" 
At Br. 17 Christenson resorts to the curious, and we submit 
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shocking argument that "factual findings of the trial court are 
not entitled to any particular deference." The major thrust of 
Christenson1s brief thereafter is to assert legal theories based 
upon the undisputed facts which are at odds with the conclusions 
of the trial judge, coupled with the argument that this Court must 
affirm if there is "any colorable evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact" supporting legal theories never adopted 
by the trial judge. 
It is correct to say that "the reviewing court applies the 
same standard as the trial court" only in the sense that a summary 
judgment is tested at either level by whether there is any dispute 
as to a material fact. It does not follow, however, that the trial 
judge's findings are entitled to "no deference" and may be ignored. 
If anything could be clear, it is that an appeal is a review of 
the work of the trial judge. It is not a trial de novo. Equally 
clear, .we submit, is that the findings by the trial judge, in-
cluding those not supporting the result, even if based upon agreed 
evidence, are entitled to a presumption that they are correct. 
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, categorically de-
clares that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . . " 
This Court has held that provision fully applicable to findings 
contained in a memorandum opinion. Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977). This Court has also declared, so fre-
quently that citation seems superfluous, that findings of fact 
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and c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e t r i a l judge a r e " c l o t h e d i n a presumpt ion 
5 / 
of c o r r e c t n e s s , " and t h a t 
[T]h i s Court w i l l no t u p s e t t h e f i n d i n g s i n t he 
t r i a l c o u r t u n l e s s t h e ev idence so c l e a r l y p r e -
p o n d e r a t e s a g a i n s t them t h a t t h i s Court i s con-
v inced t h a t m a n i f e s t i n j u s t i c e has been done. 
Horton v . Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984) . 
See a l s o , Western Kane County S p e c i a l Se rv i ce D i s t . No. 1 v. Jackson 
C a t t l e Co . , 68 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (October 29, 1987) . 
Counsel fo r Ch r i s t enson a r e obv ious ly mis taken in t h e i r c i t a -
t i o n of t h e t h r e e d e c i s i o n s of t h i s Court a t Br. 17, and t h e f ed -
e r a l c a s e s c i t e d a t Br. 18 , fo r none of them suppor t C h r i s t e n s o n 1 s 
s t a t e m e n t of t h e s t a n d a r d , e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r by any r e a s o n a b l e 
i n f e r e n c e . The c a s e s c i t e d merely a f f i rm t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 
summary judgment i s p rope r on ly i f t h e r e a r e no genuine i s s u e s a s 
t o m a t e r i a l f a c t s . That i s a m a t t e r w i th which we a g r e e , bu t 
To the same effect, see 5 AM. JUR., Appeal and Error § 704 (pocket supp.) 
6 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc . , 477 U.S. 242 (1986), quoted a t Br. 18, 
i s an important recent pronouncement on summary judgment procedure and the obl i -
gations of a "nonmoving party" to adduce evidence. I t s iirportance herein i s 
that i t rejects Christensonfs reliance on the non-record contents of the tape 
to oppose McDonalds' request for summary judgment in i t s favor on the theories 
of failure of consideration, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Liberty Lobby held that : 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fa i l s to 
make a shewing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that par ty 's case, and on which 
that party wil l bear the burden of proof a t t r i a l . 
and that : 
In cases like the instant one, where the nonmoving party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive 
issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in 
reliance solely on the "pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file." 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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it is not at issue on this appeal because the parties have 
agreed to the facts (save only those argued by Christenson con-
cerning the contents of the tape, which is not in evidence or a 
part of the Record) and do not dispute them on this appeal. 
If counsel intended to state the familiar proposition that 
conclusions of a trial judge drawn from undisputed evidence do 
not have the same weight on appeal as findings based upon disputed 
evidence, e.g., 5 AM. JUR.2d, Appeal and Error § 846, with that we 
can also agree. That is a different matter entirely, we submit, 
from the notion that a trial judge's findings "are not entitled 
to any particular deference." Moreover, that proposition is of 
no aid to an appellee such as Christenson, for it merely confirms 
that this Court can, and should reverse a clearly erroneous judg-
ment such as that of the trial judge herein. 
POINT II 
C h r i s t e n s o n 1 s " C o n s i d e r a t i o n " Theory I s 
Without Bas i s i n t h e Record and Cont ra ry 
~ t o t h e F ind ings of t h e T r i a l Judge 
Chr i s t enson i s hard p r e s s e d t o a rgue a g a i n s t t h e t r i a l j u d g e f s 
conc lus ion t h a t "Defendant unders tood t h a t t h e p roceeds of t he 
loan which i t s T r u s t Deed and Note secured would be pa id t o another 
person t o be used as c l o s i n g c o s t s fo r t h e C u r r i e r loan" and t h a t 
Footnote con t inued from p r e v i o u s page . 
Christenson may not, therefore, r e s i s t summary judgment in favor of the 
McDonalds, or support i t s own claim, by hearsay reference to the missing tape, 
a t least in the absence of an admission by the McDonalds of i t s contents, for 
Christenson clearly bears the burden of proof in that regard and i t s hearsay 
testimony i s not within the types of evidence permitted by Rule 56 (c), Utah 
Rales of Civil Procedure. 
-. 8 -
"[t]he evidence is undisputed that Defendant knew and understood 
that this consideration would be paid, not to it, but to someone 
else for use as closing costs on the Currier loan," (Mem. Op. 7.) 
(Emphasis added.) We invite the Court's careful scrutiny of the 
logical errors in Christenson's efforts to escape the consequences 
of that ruling. 
A. Christenson Argues Inconsistently Concerning the Nature 
of the "Bargain." At Br. 36 Christenson: 
[D]isputes McDonald Brothers' claim [and 
Judge Murphyy sU conclusion] that Security 
Funding "promised" or "agreed" that the 
$288,000.00 would be used for closing costs, 
or that McDonald Brothers' liability was 
"conditioned" on such use or on receiving a 
three million dollar loan. 
Similar arguments appear at Br. 23-24, 25, 27-28. At Br. 41, it 
is urged that the obviously calculated conclusions of the trial 
judge should not be taken as a "finding" because — so it is said — 
his "focus" was on something else. The rationale advanced is that 
such a representation, though clearly acknowledged at Br. 13, was 
not recited in the note and trust deed. Yet when the issue is 
Christenson's performance under the same note and trust deed, it 
is urged: 
(1) t h a t the Taped Conversation, heard by 
McDonald Brothers , provided t h a t the $288,000.00 
would be wired to an account designated as the 
"Fourex" account, which was under the cont ro l 
of Tepl i tz . . . and (2) t h a t Securi ty Funding 
in fac t wired the $288,000.00 to the "Fourex" 
account a t the express d i r ec t i on and i n s t r u c -
t ion of both Tepl i tz and Curr ie r . (Br. 21.) 
1
 In f a i rness , and considering Chris tenson's declared purpose of ge t t ing 
i t s summary judgment memorandum before t h i s Gourt, see p . 1, supra . , the quoted 
mater ia l may have been adopted fran the t r i a l memorandum without ed i t ing i t to 
f i t the i ssues on t h i s appeal. In any event, i t i s inappropriate and misleading. 
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Christenson plainly may not redefine the findings to suit 
its arguments. If the "bargain" determined by the trial judge — 
viz., that the $288,000 would be paid for the "closing" of the 
jumbo loan, and on the promise that the McDonalds would obtain $3 
million in financing out of its proceeds — cannot be considered 
if not recited in the note and trust deed, then neither may 
Christenson1s claim (unsupported by anything of record) that the 
agreement was to pay the money to the Forex account. On the other 
hand, if the "consideration" must be found within the four corners 
of the note, Christenson1s obligation with respect to payment of 
the $288,000 must also be found there. The note, attached as 
Appendix "A" to the Brief of Appellant, simply recites that it 
was "for value received." The agreed fact is that the McDonalds 
never "received" the $288,000. 
The "bargain therefore fails, either (1) because "value" in 
the form of the bargain determined by the trial judge was not 
given, or (2) because Christenson never paid the $288,000 recited 
in the note to the McDonalds. The alternate theory advanced by 
Christenson, that the "bargain" is as contained on the missing 
tape, is of no avail under the first alternative because (a) the 
tape is not of record, (b) the trial judge entered no findings to 
that effect, and (c) the McDonalds have not admitted Christenson1s 
account of its contents. Christenson1s theory is of no avail 
under its second alternative because the contents of the tape are 
not recited or incorporated in the note. 
It is not, therefore, a matter of the McDonalds having 
"changed its story" (see Br. 37), but one of meeting the con-
- 10 -
stantly shifting, and contradictory, claims of Christenson. 
B. Christenson Admits the Trial Judge's Conclusion 
Concerning the "Bargain," Despite all of its inconsistencies and 
diversionary arguments concerning the contents of the missing 
tape, the Brief of Appellee admits the essential facts concerning 
the crucial issue of "consideration." At Br. 13 Christenson ac-
knowledges the bargain of the McDonalds, essentially in the terms 
determined by the trial judge: 
Sorenson represented to Stevenson McDonald 
that by providing security for the $288,000.00 
loan to Currier, McDonald Brothers would 
ultimately obtain its three million dollar 
loan from the proceeds of the Currier loan, 
as well as a $250,000.00 bonus to be paid by 
Currier from the loan proceeds. Sorenson 
Depo. No. 1, at 35-37, 68-72, R. at 707, 713. 
Christenson acknowledges, further, the failure of considera-
tion at Br. 13, with its statement that the "McDonald Brothers 
never received its expected three million dollar loan from the 
Currier Loan funds." 
POINT III 
The Alternate "Consideration" Theory 
Fails the "Bargained For" Test 
Even if the trial judge had adopted Christenson1s "considera-
tion" theory, on the agreed facts it would fail the "bargained for" 
test. 
A. The Guaranty was not "Unconditional". The Brief of 
Appellee recognizes, correctly we submit, that the decision of the 
trial judge cannot be affirmed unless the McDonalds' guaranty is 
construed as an unconditional one. Christenson therefore makes 
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that assumption, by reasoning that the note contains no requirement 
that the $288,000 be paid at a "closing". Christenson then 
effects a "straw man" argument, albeit ineffectually, at Br. 25-28, 
with its urging that "Security Funding is aware of no legal pre-
cedent that would impose upon it implied duties" and that a guar-
anty may not be "construed as 'contingent1 . . . unless such act 
or contingency is set out in the written instrument. . . . " 
The argument merely states the obvious. If the guaranty were 
"unconditional," then payment to the principal creditor would be 
sufficient "consideration." Conversely, if the guaranty is 
"conditional," there is "consideration" only if the conditions 
have been met. 
The flaw in Christenson1s reasoning is that without resort 
to extrinsic evidence the note and trust deed do not even contain 
provisions establishing that they were given as a guaranty. If 
the condition may not be found in extrinsic evidence, then neither 
may the fact of the note and trust deed having been given as a 
guaranty, and we are left with a failure of consideration because 
the $288,000 recited in the note was not paid to the McDonalds. 
More conclusive still, the trial judge has determined that 
the "bargain" was to apply the $288,000 to "closing costs." The 
guaranty was not, therefore, "unconditional" nor is there any need 
£/ 
to "imply" any duty. 
Even if there were, Christenson is plainly wrong, for UCC § 1-203 (Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-203) inposes an implied duty of good faith. If counsel know 
of no precedent applying that iuplied duty, they have evidently neglected the 
numerous decisions of this and other courts cited at Brief of Appellant 21, 
26-27. 
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B. Christenson Ignores the "Bargained For" Requirement, 
We think it significant that Christenson fails to address the 
"bargained for" definition of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71, including 
comment b, quoted-at Brief of Appellant p. 32, or cite any evidence 
that the payment to Forex was "bargained for" by the McDonalds. 
Urging that there is no evidence that Christenson agreed to an 
"escrow" or to pay the $288,000 at a closing (Br. 23) is of no 
avail, both because the trial judge concluded otherwise and be-
cause comment b. makes clear that the bargain must be "reciprocal." 
If Christenson understood that the $288,000 was to be paid to 
Forex, as now contended, and the McDonalds understood that it was 
to be paid at a "closing" on the jumbo loan, as the trial judge 
concluded, all that is established is that there was no "reciprocal 
bargain." 
Christenson1s payment of the $288,000 to Forex Monetary, Ltd. 
plainly was not pursuant to a "bargain," as defined at RESTATEMENT, 
CONTRACTS 2d § 71: 
§ 71. Requirement of Exchange; Type of Exchange. 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance 
or a return promise must be bargained for. 
(2) A performance or return promise is bar-
gained for if it is sought by the promisor in 
exchange for his promise and is given by the 
promisee in exchange for that promise. 
It is of no consequence that Christenson may have believed 
that payment to Forex was contemplated by the contents of the 
missing tape, for the trial judge has concluded, as he must on 
the agreed record, that the McDonalds had no such understanding. 
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Christenson is simply mistaken in the assertion at Br. 22 
that "the question before this Court is not the subjective expec-
tations of McDonald Brothers or anyone else." The subjective 
intent of both parties to the contract is an essential ingredient 
of the "bargain" required by RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 2d § 71. See 
comment "b": 
Bargained for. [T]he consideration and the 
promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive 
or inducement: the consideration induces the 
making of the promise and the promise induces 
the furnishing of the consideration. 
• . . [I]t is not enough that the promise 
induces the conduct of the promisee or that 
the conduct of the promisee induces the making 
of the promise; both elements must be present, 
or there is no bargain. 
Moreover, contrary to Christenson1s repeated contention that 
the "bargain" found by the trial judge cannot be recognized if 
not recited in the four corners of the note, United States v. 
Everett Cristo Hotel, 524 F.2d 127, 130 (9th Cir. 1975) (relied 
upon at Br. 26) pointedly held that: 
It is well settled that in assessing whether 
a condition precedent of other signers existed, 
parol evidence may be considered. This rule 
is merely an application of the general rule 
that parol evidence may be used to show a con-
dition precedent to a contract. Parol evidence, 
of course, includes both oral and written evi-
dence extrinsic to the contract. (Emphasis 
added.) (Citations omitted.) 
Kidman v. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P.2d 898, 899 (1963) (relied 
upon at Br. 25) also recognized that the terms of a contract may 
be "implied." 
C. Authorities Cited by Christenson are Inapposite. Argument 
at Br. 25-28, and at Br. 37-39, that the mere payment by an obligee 
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on a note, guaranty or accommodation agreement is sufficient "con-
sideration" therefore misses the point. That would be so only if 
the payment was according to the "bargain." The lengthy string 
of citations at Br. 26-27 are largely irrelevant, for they deal 
with a guaranty which is unconditional. Neither do any of the 
cases cited at Br. 38 support the assertion that mere disbursement 
of funds by a promisee on a conditional note, guaranty or accom-
modation agreement is sufficient consideration "as a matter of 
law." To the contrary, each of them require that the disbursement 
be "bargained for," and Paul Revere Protective Life Ins. Co. v. 
Weis, 535 F. Supp. 379, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (relied upon at Br. 
38) pointedly declared that "[i]t is well established that only 
those contracts of guaranty which are founded on some 'bargained 
for1 consideration are enforceable." Every other case cited 
deals with a disbursement as per the agreement. None of them 
hold that disbursement contrary to a bargain such as the trial 
judge determined herein will form "consideration." Unruh v. 
Nevada National Bank, 88 Nev. 427, 498 P.2d 1349 (1972), for 
example, on which Christenson places heavy reliance at Br. 38, 
squarely held that "a 'bargained for1 consideration may be given 
to the promisor or to some other person." (Emphasis added.) Id. 
at 1350. To the extent that the authorities cited at Br. 25-27, 
38 are in point, therefore, they eloquently stand against the 
proposition they are cited for. 
D. Christenson1s Theory is Lacking in Reason. We submit 
that Christenson1s contentions in this regard are best evaluated 
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by subjecting them to the test of reason. Are we to believe, 
really, that the McDonalds pledged their property to a total 
stranger, Christenson, unconditionally and for the benefit of 
another total stranger, Currier? No rational person would do 
that, unless they were promised an inducement, yet that is what 
Christenson1s argument requires, precisely. The trial judge 
wisely looked at the extrinsic evidence and determined that the 
McDonalds were promised an inducement in the form of a promise 
to apply the $288,000 to the "closing" of the jumbo loan, from 
which they would obtain their $3 million financing. Christenson 
acknowledges at Br. 13 that the condition was not satisfied and 
this Court plainly held in Packaging Corp. of America v. Morris, 
561 P.2d 680, 681 (Utah 1977) (relied upon at Br. 26) that the 
guarantor is not liable if "the creditor had actual or construc-
tive knowledge of a condition which was not fulfilled." 
We can certainly agree that Christenson understood the term 
"escrow" loosely, as asserted at Br. 23 n. 7. That is, in fact, 
the cause of the loss and the breach of good faith and fair dealing 
that the McDonalds complain of. There is no evidence that the 
McDonalds had that understanding, however, or that the Forex 
1/ 
account was an "escrow" in any sense of t h e word — and 
Chr i s t enson c i t e s t h i s Court t o no t e s t imony of t h e McDonalds 
s u p p o r t i n g t h a t t h e o r y . On t h e s t i p u l a t e d ev idence t h e r e could 
9We agree with the authorit ies cited a t Br. 32-33 defining an escrow as 
a "three party contract" or "triangular arrangement" with an "independent third 
party" and subject to "delivery . . . upon the occurrence of a specified condi-
t ion." The delivery of the $288,000 to Forex satisf ied none of those conditions 
and plainly was not an "escrow." Christenson1 s argument that Christenson was 
not an escrow as to the McDonalds i s pointless, for we have made no such claim. 
- 16 -
be no such understanding, for Christenson agrees that it had no 
contact with the McDonalds until about a year later. (Br. 14.) 
Surely on the agreed facts the McDonalds were entitled to 
expect that transactions involving billions of dollars would be 
conducted in the ordinary course of business affairs, and that 
concepts like "escrow" would be given their ordinary and accepted 
W 
meaning and that the "closing" would be conducted in the ordin-
al/ 
ary and accepted manner. Even if that were not so, the 
"obligation of good faith" in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203 would 
impose such a duty. 
POINT IV 
Chr i s t enson Does Not Dispute I t s 
"Unclean Hands" 
In d e a l i n g wi th t h e iii p a r i d e l i c t o , or "unclean hands" 
problem a t Br. 28-29 , Chr i s t enson does no t d i s p u t e t h a t i t s f a i l -
u re t o apply t h e $288,000 t o t h e " c l o s i n g " of t h e jumbo loan was 
t he cause of t h e l o s s . I t i s u rged , i n s t e a d , t h a t (1) t h e f a i l -
u re may no t be cons ide r ed a b reach of good f a i t h and f a i r d e a l i n g 
u n l e s s the o b l i g a t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h an "escrow" or apply the money 
a t a " c l o s i n g " was r e c i t e d as "a p a r t of t h e w r i t t e n agreement , " 
"Closing" means the actual, physical delivery of the property contracted 
for. Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 15 Del. Ch. 231, 136 A. 140, 143 (1926). 
BLACKS IAW DICTIONARY defines "close" to mean: 
To finish, terminate, complete, wind up; as , to "close" 
an account, a bargain, an es ta te , or public books, such 
as tax books. Bilafsky v. Abraham, 183 Mass. 401, 67 
N.E. 318. 
n Cf . , UCC § 9-207(1), Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-207(l) and Clayton v. Cross-
roads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (1982), quoted a t Brief of Appellants 
25, both of which impose a duty to exercise ordinary business prudence. 
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and (2) that the McDonalds were relying on Sorenson, rather than 
Christenson. Neither contention is supported by the record, or 
constitutes a defense even if it were. 
A. Contract Provisions are Irrelevant to a Legal Duty. 
Christenson's first argument is patently frivolous. The in pari 
delicto defense arises by operation of law (see Brief of Appellants 
p. 19). The obligation of good faith and fair dealing, which we 
submit requires adherence to ordinary commercial practices in the 
closing of a loan, is imposed by statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
70A-1-203. No contract recital is necessary in either instance. 
Indeed, Christenson1s own authorities reject its contentions 
in this regard. Rabon v. Putnam, 164 F.2d 80, 83 (10th Cir. 
1947) (relied upon at Br. 26) does not hold that representations 
12/ 
of a third party such as Sorenson cannot be part of the "bargain1", 
but appropos the conduct of Teplitz, and Christenson1s failure 
to follow the ordinary commercial practice of establishing an 
escrow, or pay the $288,000.00 at a closing, and consistent with 
the authorities cited at Brief of Appellant p. 19, held that: 
[W]here one of two innocent persons must 
suffer because of the acts of a third 
person, the one who enabled the third per-
son to occasion the loss, must sustain it. 
B. Sorenson1s Representative Capacity is Misstated. Alter-
nately, it is urged at Br. 27 that "McDonald Brothers was not even 
-^ Counsel evidently misread the case with their assertion at Br. 26 that 
the creditor is not bound if "the party soliciting the guaranty has represented 
that liability thereunder will be contingent, or that the guarantor will receive 
some additional benefit in return for its execution." Rabon v. Putnam, op. cit. 
supra., merely held that the creditor is not bound by the "fraud" of a third 
party. Christenson has made no claim that the representation of Sorenson to 
the McDonalds was "fraudulent." 
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relying on Security Funding to assure that these things [viz., 
an "escrow" and a "closing"] occurred, but was relying on 
Sorenson. . . . " 
• The argument is obvious "makeweight," without any support 
in the record. The trial judge declined to find that Sorenson 
was the McDonalds1 "agent," holding merely that he "was acting 
for and on behalf of defendant for consideration" (Mem. Op. 3), 
and even then only "in obtaining that loan." (Mem. Op. 2, quoting 
from Stevenson McDonald.) Repeated reference to Christenson1s 
characterization of the evidence in its "Statement of Undisputed 
Facts" (see Br. 9-10 and 13-14) is of no avail, unless supported 
by the underlying testimony. In point of fact, the testimony cat-
egorically rejects Christenson1s agency claims. 
Christenson misstates the record — outrageously, we submit 
— with its assertion that "Stevenson McDonald did not expect to 
have any control over the release of the $28 8,000.00 loan by 
Security Funding to Currier; and was relying on Sorenson and 
Zabriskie to protect his interests in the transaction." Br. 9. 
To the same effect, see Br. 11, 27, 45. The testimony of Stevenson 
McDonald cited in support of that characterization does not even 
discuss the meeting with Teplitz in Camden, New Jersey: 
Q. (BY MR. JAMES) What was the nature of 
your relationship with Larry Sorenson? 
A. He indicated to us that he was some sort 
of broker and could arrange a loan for us and would 
receive a commission from the loan proceeds.—' 
This is the answer the trial judge referred to as having been corrected. 
The answer, before being corrected, was: "He was an agent representing us in 
obtaining that loan." In either event, it plainly does not refer to the trans-
actions in Camden, New Jersey, and does not support Christensonfs characteriz-
ation. The trial judge correctly observed that, viiichever version of the 
answer is considered, Sorenson*s capacity was the same. 
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Q. What was to happen to the $288,000? 
A. That was to pay the closing costs on the 
loan that was to furnish the funds for the loan 
that was to come to us. 
Q. Who was the $288,000 to be sent to, or 
delivered to, or given to? 
A. It was represented to us that it was a 
Security Funding. 
Q. Who was it to be given to? 
A. I don't know. It was to the ones that 
were, they were working with to get the loan. 
(Emphasis added.) (S. McDonald Depo. p. 19) 
There is simply no evidence that Sorenson was the McDonalds' 
agent when he attended the meeting in Camden, New Jersey, or that 
the McDonalds relied on him to represent them. It would be of 
little consequence, we submit, if they had, for Sorenson had no 
control over Christenson1s transmittal of the $288,000 and he did 
not, nor could he, excuse Christenson of any duty imposed by law. 
C. Sorenson Had No Authority to Extend Currier's Performance 
or Release Her Collateral. The claim that Sorenson was somehow 
an "agent" is repeated at Br. 45, where it is urged that Sorenson1s 
"consent" to an extension of time for Currier's performance and 
substitution of her collateral was somehow binding on the McDonalds. 
Sorenson squarely testified to the contrary, stating that he had 
no such authority. At Sorenson Depo. dated March 4, 1986 p. 77, 
Sorenson was questioned by counsel for Christenson in that regard 
and he testified that he did not discuss the terms of the agreement 
with the McDonalds prior to the time of his executing it, and at 
Id., p. 79, testified that Howard McDonald rejected the notion 
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that he was acting in the McDonalds' behalf: 
Q. [by Mr. Anderson] Did you review it [the 
Currier extension] with him? 
A. Yes — let's see, let me read a couple of 
things here. Howard's main concern was that I was 
not an employee of his, and that this was a separate 
document where I was agreeing to try to come up with 
the money for Neil Christenson in other ways . . . . 
Q. Do you recall discussing with Howard on 
that occasion what, if any, benefit this agreement 
provided for the McDonald brothers? 
A. No, I don't. It's evident that it provided 
a situation where it stopped any foreclosure pro-
ceedings for a while. 
Q. Do you recall discussing that with them? 
A. I don't recall that, no. 
Q. You don't recall it either way? 
A. Either way. (Emphasis added.) 
Christenson thus takes unwarranted liberty with the agreed 
facts by suggesting that Sorenson was the agent of the McDonalds 
in any sense of the word, for any purpose, or at any point in time. 
POINT V 
Christenson Cites Neither Facts Nor 
Authorities to Avoid its Release of McDonalds' Obligation 
By Changing the Terms of Currier's Performance 
At Br. 13-14 and 41-44 Christenson indulges in more convo-
luted arguments to avoid the obvious effect of its modification 
of the agreement with Currier as effecting a release of the 
McDonalds' secondary obligation. Such arguments simply will not 
withstand analysis. 
A. No Facts Indicate That McDonalds Agreed to any Modifi-
cation or Extension. At paragraph 26, beginning at the bottom 
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of Br. 13 and extending through the four subparagraphs on page 14, 
Christenson urges that "an agreement was entered into between 
Sorenson and Security Funding" (emphasis added) to extend the 
time for performance under the agreement. We submit that the 
statement of the proposition is itself misleading, for Sorenson 
is not the contracting party whose consent is required and there 
is no assertion that the McDonalds were parties to that agreement, 
nor could there be. Sorenson1s "agreement" is entirely without 
relevance. Sorenson declared in his deposition dated March 4, 
1986, pe 76 that "that's an agreement between Security Funding 
and myself" and never declared, or suggested in any way that he 
was acting as an agent for the McDonalds. (See supra, p. 20-21.) 
Moreover, if there could be any doubt in that regard, the 
Brief of Christenson makes clear that there was no discussion of 
Currier's extension with the McDonalds until almost a year after 
the time of her default. At paragraph 27, Br. 14, Christenson 
acknowledges that "[s]ometime in July of 1982 the McDonalds were 
contacted by Garrett of Security Funding by telephone" and that 
"this was the first time any representative of McDonald brothers 
had ever spoken to anyone from Security Funding." (Emphasis added.) 
It is important for this Court to recall that the note and trust 
deed were executed almost a year earlier, on August 20, 1981, and 
were to have closed within a period of ten days. Christenson in 
fact acknowledges at Br. 35 n.17 that "neither Howard nor Stevenson 
McDonald met or even spoke to Security Funding representatives 
until nearly one year after Stevenson McDonald executed the note 
and trust deed." 
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It is therefore clear, on Christenson1s own statement of the 
facts, that there was no consent by the McDonalds to an extension 
of the time for performance by the primary obligor, Linda Currier, 
either directly or by anyone acting as their representative. 
That admission is fatal, for Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 requires 
both the "consent" of a guarantor and a "reservation of rights" 
against him. On the agreed facts, there was neither. 
B. Christenson Misapplies the Law Respecting "Release." 
We have no disagreement with the citation of authorities at Br. 
42 for the proposition that "consent to an extension of time for 
repayment or to the release of collateral may be given in advance 
in the instrument itself," or that the McDonalds consented in 
advance to extensions of the promissory note that they executed. 
That fails to address the issue of the lack of consent by the 
McDonalds to the extension of the time and terms of performance 
on the Currier note, which was a separate instrument as to which 
they were guarantors. The flaw in Christenson1s reasoning, again 
fatal, is that Currier's obligation was neither created nor gov-
erned by the note signed by the McDonalds, and the language of 
the note quoted at Br. 43 plainly declares that the consent to 
extensions was limited to the obligations "of this note": 
[t]he makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers 
hereof severally waive presentment for payment, 
demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of 
this note, and consent to any and all extensions 
of time, renewals, waivers or nullifications that 
may be granted by the holder hereof with respect 
to the payment or other provisions of this note, 
and to the release of any security, or any part 
thereof, with or without substitutions. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Christenson attempts to extend the "consent" by the McDonalds 
to extensions of their own obligation to separate arrangements 
between itself and Currier with the convoluted arguments at the 
bottom of page 43 to the effect that the provision should be 
applied to the Currier note because there was "only one loan for 
$288,000.00" and because "any payments by Currier would neces-
sarily be applied to and would reduce the obligation of McDonald 
Brothers under the Note," That is sheer sophistry, however, 
which obviously cannot overcome the plain declarations of the 
note itself. It is also inconsistent with Christenson's urging 
at Br. 27, 3 6 that the payment of the $2 8 8,000 into escrow, or 
at a "closing," must be recited in the agreement itself. 
C. Nor Did the McDonalds Consent After the Fact. At Bre 44, 
Christenson makes the argument that when the McDonalds were in-
formed in July of 1982, that Christenson had granted an extension 
to Currier, "McDonald Brothers agreed that the time should be 
extended for Currier's performance." In point of fact, the tes-
timony of Howard McDonald at pages 48 and 49 of his deposition 
fails to support that assertion. Howard McDonald never stated, 
either in substance or effect, that he "consented" to giving 
Currier an extension, nor does Christenson state that he did. 
Howard McDonald merely described his mental processes: "we thought 
that would probably be a good idea." 
Indeed, it was "a good idea" insofar as it had the effect of 
releasing the McDonalds from liability. 
Moreover, even if Christenson1s interpretation of Howard 
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McDonald's ambiguous testimony could be adopted, it still does 
not amount to consent for the substitution of deeds on the Currier 
property or the increase of the "bonus" payable to Christenson 
from $1 million to $1.5 million. Those matters were never even 
disclosed. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-606 requires "consent" not 
just to the extension, but to any impairment of "collateral." 
Clearly, there was no such consent, and Christenson makes no claim 
that there was. 
CONCLUSION 
Christenson is thus hoisted on the petard of its contradic-
tory arguments. It is simply not possible, at least in logic, to 
argue that the trial judge should be affirmed while urging that 
the factual determinations of the trial judge are in error and 
must be ignored. Neither can it be urged, with any consistency, 
that Christenson1s conduct under the agreement can be justified 
by extrinsic evidence of a tape never produced in evidence, but 
that Christenson1s obligations to the McDonalds must be strictly 
documented by the terms of the note and trust deed. The convo-
lutions in reasoning necessary to justify the result reached in 
the trial court, when compared to the stipulated evidence, attest 
that the decision below cannot be sustained and should be reversed, 
and the McDonalds' motion for summary judgment be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this day of January, 1988. 
?arkeF~3f]! Nielson 
Glen M. Richman 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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